IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/qed/wpaper/809.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Public Firms as Regulatory and Auditing Instruments

Author

Listed:
  • Devon Garvie
  • Roger Ware

Abstract

We re-examine the regulatory role of a public firm in an environment of private but correlated information about industry costs. We study three regimes of mixed market interaction involving both public and private firms: a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, an asymmetric Bayesian equilibrium in which the public firm is able to commit to production before the private firms and a mechanism in which the regulator designs an incentive compatible schedule for the industry. We find that a public firms plays an important strategic informational role which strengthens its role as a disciplinary regulatory instrument. Further, we find that this strategic informational role is considerably enchanced as we move from indirect regulatory schemes to direct regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Devon Garvie & Roger Ware, 1991. "Public Firms as Regulatory and Auditing Instruments," Working Paper 809, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:809
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_809.pdf
    File Function: First version 1991
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Barros, Fatima, 1995. "Incentive schemes as strategic variables: An application to a mixed duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 373-386, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:809. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mark Babcock (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/qedquca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.