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Enhancing Voluntary Compliance By Reducing Compliance Costs: A Taxpayer Service Approach

Author

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  • Glenn Jenkins

    (Queen's University, Kingston, On, Canada)

  • EDWIN FORLEMU

Abstract

In this paper an overview is made of the determinants of voluntary tax compliance. Unlike previous treatments of this subject, the cost of taxpayer compliance is considered as an important determinant of overall level of voluntary compliance in a country. A number of ways that tax authorities reduce compliance are discussed, and the most common uses of information technology in providing taxpayer service is described. Finally, the paper considers some of the ways that such activities might be monitored so that only cost-effective measures are implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • Glenn Jenkins & EDWIN FORLEMU, 1993. "Enhancing Voluntary Compliance By Reducing Compliance Costs: A Taxpayer Service Approach," Development Discussion Papers 1993-04, JDI Executive Programs.
    • Handle: RePEc:qed:dpaper:109
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Blumenthal, Marsha & Slemrod, Joel, 1992. "The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax System: A Second Look After Tax Reform," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 45(2), pages 185-202, June.
    3. Blumenthal, Marsha & Slemrod, Joel, 1992. "The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax System: A Second Look After Tax Reform," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 45(2), pages 185-202, June.
    4. Grasmick, Harold G. & Scott, Wilbur J., 1982. "Tax evasion and mechanisms of social control: A comparison with grand and petty theft," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 213-230, September.
    5. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-373, August.
    6. Joel Slemrod & Nikki Sorum, 1984. "The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax System," NBER Working Papers 1401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    8. Glenn Jenkins, 1989. "Tax Reform: Lessons Learned," Development Discussion Papers 1989-02, JDI Executive Programs.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:ind:nipfwp:13 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Agumas Alamirew Mebratu, 2024. "Theoretical foundations of voluntary tax compliance: evidence from a developing country," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-8, December.
    3. repec:npf:wpaper:13 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Das-Gupta, Arindam, 2004. "Economic theory of tax compliance with special reference to tax compliance costs," Working Papers 04/13, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voluntary tax compliance; cost reduction; monitoring measures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

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