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Evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated collective action with a contest for power

Author

Listed:
  • Yaroslav Rosokha
  • Xinxin Lyu
  • Denis Tverskoi
  • Sergey Gavrilets

Abstract

Social and political inequality among individuals is a common driving force behind the breakdown in cooperation. In this paper, we theoretically and experimentally study cooperation among individuals facing a sequence of collective-action problems in which the benefits of cooperation are divided according to political power that is obtained through a contest. We have three main results. First, we find that cooperation predictably responds to the fundamental parameters of the collectiveaction problem. Specifically, it is increasing in the benefit to cooperation and how much benefit is gained from partial group cooperation, and decreasing in the number of players. Second, we find that when players are unrestricted in their expenditures in the contest, cooperation is much lower than when expenditures are set to a specific proportion of earnings. Finally, we find that individual norms and beliefs account for a substantial proportion of explained variance in individuals’ decisions to cooperate.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaroslav Rosokha & Xinxin Lyu & Denis Tverskoi & Sergey Gavrilets, 2023. "Evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated collective action with a contest for power," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1348, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1348
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    File URL: https://business.purdue.edu/research/working-papers-series/2024/1348.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperation; Contest; Dynamic Coordination Games; Indefinitely Repeated Games; Experimental Design; Beliefs; Individual and Social Norms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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