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The Relationship Between Liquidity Risk and Internal and External Factors in TCL Corporation

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  • Zulamir Hassani, Afdhal

Abstract

The purpose of this study to examine the performance of TCL Corporation with specific factors and macroeconomic variable influence on liquidity risk (quick ratio) the data was obtained from the annual report from year 2014 to 2018 of TCL Corporation. This study using a descriptive analysis such as credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and also economic environment as to compare the performance of the company involve in TCL Corporation. The finding shows that the company performance can be influenced by the internal risk and economic environment. The study found quick ratio, return on asset, average-collection period, operating ratio, index score, GDP growth rate, exchange rate, interest rate, inflation rate and beta. And operating ratio are significant to quick ratio.

Suggested Citation

  • Zulamir Hassani, Afdhal, 2019. "The Relationship Between Liquidity Risk and Internal and External Factors in TCL Corporation," MPRA Paper 97208, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Nov 2019.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:97208
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Liquidity risk; Internal; External Factors;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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