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The Institutional Dynamics of Colonial Exploitation

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  • D'Alessandro, Simone
  • DISTEFANO, Tiziano

Abstract

This paper focuses on the interaction between the legacy of institutional arrangements and incentives on long-term development. We recalled two studies focusing on the long term effects of geographic discontinuities in colonial practice in India and Peru and we confronted the two historical cases as to emphasise the role of capital accumulation and equality of distribution. Furthermore, we propose an evolutionary game model to capture the evolutionary dynamics of institutional assets defining egalitarian or iniquitous income divisions in a non-cooperative setting. This framework sheds light on the role of the colonial governments in the interaction between local institutions and foreign colonial rule in terms of distribution, resources extraction, social asymmetries and finalised investments.

Suggested Citation

  • D'Alessandro, Simone & DISTEFANO, Tiziano, 2019. "The Institutional Dynamics of Colonial Exploitation," MPRA Paper 94836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:94836
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Easterly, William, 2007. "Inequality does cause underdevelopment: Insights from a new instrument," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 755-776, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Colonialism; Evolutionary Game Theory; Solow growth theory; inequality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F43 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Economic Growth of Open Economies
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • P3 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions

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