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Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners

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  • Marinucci, Marco

Abstract

This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV's profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Marinucci, Marco, 2008. "Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners," MPRA Paper 9058, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:9058
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    Cited by:

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    3. Hiroshi Osano, 2011. "Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 202-223, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D43; L13; L14; L22;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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