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Corporate Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Miller, Alan

Abstract

I introduce a model of corporate voting. I characterize the shareholder majority rule as the unique corporate voting rule that satisfies four axioms: anonymity, neutrality, share monotonicity, and merger, a property that requires consistency in election outcomes following stock-for-stock mergers.

Suggested Citation

  • Miller, Alan, 2017. "Corporate Voting," MPRA Paper 79185, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:79185
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79185/1/MPRA_paper_79185.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January.
    2. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    3. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate governance : Voting rights and majority rules," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 203-235, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate voting; axioms; shareholder majority rule; quotas rules; merger; one share-one vote;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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