Corporate Voting
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Corporate voting; axioms; shareholder majority rule; quotas rules; merger; one share-one vote;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2017-05-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAW-2017-05-28 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2017-05-28 (Microeconomics)
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