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Fraud Detection, Conservatism and Political Economy of Whistle Blowing

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  • Ozili, Peterson K

Abstract

This paper presents a discussion on whistle-blowing and take the view that whistle-blowing is an important fraud detection technique. A discussion of some factors that influence the whistle-blowers’ incentive to blow the whistle or to remain silent in the face of persuasive fraud red flags, is also presented. The paper suggests that the tradeoff between the cost and benefit of whistle-blowing may compel the whistle-blower to apply some degree of conservatism in their whistle-blowing activities. Also, some discussion on how whistle-blowing might be influenced by firm-level politics, country-level political economy, firm ownership and other institutional factors is presented. Finally, although the provision of incentives can increase the appeal to encourage whistle-blowing, the appeal to blow the whistle may be weakened when the whistle-blower takes into account the larger context that influence the decision to blow the whistle or to remain silent.

Suggested Citation

  • Ozili, Peterson K, 2016. "Fraud Detection, Conservatism and Political Economy of Whistle Blowing," MPRA Paper 74982, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:74982
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74982/1/MPRA_paper_74982.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 473-494.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Forensic Accounting; Fraud Detection; Whistle Blowing; Politics; Conservatism; Ownership Control; Political Economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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