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Forty two Flawed Arguments for and Against Full Reserve Banking

Author

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  • Musgrave, Ralph

Abstract

The basics of full reserve (FR) banking are set out below, followed by thirty eight flawed arguments against, and four flawed arguments for full reserve (also known as “100% reserve”). Each argument set out below has: 1. A heading (which also appears in the table of contents below). 2. Where the heading does not adequately capture the nature of the argument, there is a paragraph below the heading starting “I.e…”, which expands on the heading. 3. There are references one or more economists who have put the relevant argument in almost every case. 4. The answer to each argument which starts with a paragraph beginning with the word “Answer.”

Suggested Citation

  • Musgrave, Ralph, 2014. "Forty two Flawed Arguments for and Against Full Reserve Banking," MPRA Paper 56123, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:56123
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56123/1/MPRA_paper_56123.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1986. "Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 55-68, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ralph S. MUSGRAVE, 2016. "Forty Defective Criticisms of Full Reserve Banking," Journal of Economics Library, KSP Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 488-507, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking; full reserve; 100% reserve;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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