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Environmental lobbying with imperfect monitoring of environmental quality

Author

Listed:
  • Beard, Rodney
  • Mallawaarachchi, Thilak
  • Salerno, Gillian

Abstract

In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality. We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private monitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in the context of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farm extension programmes highlighted.

Suggested Citation

  • Beard, Rodney & Mallawaarachchi, Thilak & Salerno, Gillian, 2007. "Environmental lobbying with imperfect monitoring of environmental quality," MPRA Paper 5346, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5346
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Polk, Andreas & Schmutzler, Armin, 2005. "Lobbying against environmental regulation vs. lobbying for loopholes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 915-931, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; public choice; imperfect public monitoring; imperfect private monitoring; non-point source pollution; agricultural extension and public education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
    • Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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