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Raising Wages as a Strategy to Reduce Corruption

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  • Sato, Hideki

Abstract

This paper examines whether raising the salaries of government tax auditors reduces their incentive to accept bribes. It evaluates an optimal tax structure and economic welfare under conditions of perfect and imperfect information in relation to conditions for bribery. The major policy implication of this paper is that it is not necessarily desirable to increase salaries as an anticorruption measure. Even if government can reduce corruption by improving civil servants’ pay, obtaining funds to do so by raising the income tax will worsen economic welfare, based on the optimal tax structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Sato, Hideki, 2011. "Raising Wages as a Strategy to Reduce Corruption," MPRA Paper 45688, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:45688
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kim C. Border & Joel Sobel, 1987. "Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(4), pages 525-540.
    2. Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415.
    3. Ksh. Jhaljit Singh, 2008. "On tax evaders and corrupt auditors," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 37-67.
    4. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
    5. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1990. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Progressivity of Income Taxes," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 410-431, Fall.
    6. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee, 1989. "Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 139-163, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anticorruption; Wages; Optimal Tax; Tax Evasion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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