IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/38348.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Corporate investment decisions under asymmetric information and uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Bell, Peter N

Abstract

This paper develops a model to study corporate investment decisions using the principal-agent framework. The model has asymmetric information where the agent knows the true value of the company and the principal does not. The model also has uncertainty where the company is presented an investment opportunity with a certain cost and random benefit. The agent must decide whether they will sell stock to the principal and make the investment. Results show that the information asymmetry imposes a cost on the principal because the agent will forgo some profitable projects or undertake some with expected losses. A procedure for the principal to distinguish undervalued and overvalued companies is presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Bell, Peter N, 2012. "Corporate investment decisions under asymmetric information and uncertainty," MPRA Paper 38348, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38348
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38348/1/MPRA_paper_38348.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    3. Linda Schmid Klein & Thomas J. O’Brien & Stephen R. Peters, 2002. "Debt vs. Equity and Asymmetric Information: A Review," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 37(3), pages 317-349, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Florian Meier, 2020. "The Age of Cheap Money and Passive Investing: Are Pro Forma Earnings Value Relevant?," Journal of Finance and Investment Analysis, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 9(2), pages 1-1.
    2. Jacek Jaworski & Leszek Czerwonka, 2021. "Determinants of Enterprises’ Capital Structure in Energy Industry: Evidence from European Union," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(7), pages 1-21, March.
    3. Miglo, Anton, 2022. "Theories of financing for entrepreneurial firms: a review," MPRA Paper 115835, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Ashraf Ismail & Seunghack Oh & Nuruzzaman Arsyad, 2015. "Split ratings and debt‐signaling in bond markets: A note," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(1), pages 36-41, January.
    5. Anton Miglo, 2012. "Managers versus Students: New Approach in Improving Capital Structure Education," Journal of Education and Vocational Research, AMH International, vol. 3(11), pages 353-369.
    6. Anton Miglo, 2022. "Theories of Crowdfunding and Token Issues: A Review," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(5), pages 1-28, May.
    7. Rosen, Harvey S. & Sappington, Alexander J.W., 2016. "To borrow or not to borrow? An analysis of university leverage decisions," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 170-185.
    8. David Gordon, 2014. "Linkages in Capital Structure Theory and Economics," Research in Applied Economics, Macrothink Institute, vol. 6(3), pages 43-55, September.
    9. Ismail, Ashraf & Oh, Seunghack & Arsyad, Nuruzzaman, 2015. "Split ratings and debt-signaling in bond markets: A note," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 36-41.
    10. Miglo, Anton, 2017. "Timing of earnings and capital structure," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-15.
    11. David Abad & Juan Pedro Sánchez-Ballesta & José Yagüe, 2017. "The short-term debt choice under asymmetric information," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 261-285, August.
    12. Miglo, Anton & Liang, Shuting & Lee, Zhenting, 2014. "Capital Structure of Internet Companies: Case Study," MPRA Paper 56330, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Andres, Christian & Cumming, Douglas & Karabiber, Timur & Schweizer, Denis, 2014. "Do markets anticipate capital structure decisions? — Feedback effects in equity liquidity," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 133-156.
    14. Neville, Conor & Lucey, Brian M., 2022. "Financing Irish high-tech SMEs: The analysis of capital structure," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    15. Patrik Bauer, 2004. "Capital Structure of Listed Companies in Visegrad Countries," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2004(2), pages 159-175.
    16. Meskat Ibne Sharif, 2019. "Fundamental Drivers of Capital Structure: Evidence from Publicly Traded Non-financial U.S. Firms," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 9(6), pages 113-122.
    17. Jang, Soomi & Choi, Heeick & Kim, Hyung Tae (Ted), 2023. "Firm-level political risk and external financing choices," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PA).
    18. Wang, Taiyuan & Thornhill, Stewart, 2010. "R&D investment and financing choices: A comprehensive perspective," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1148-1159, November.
    19. Ordoñez, Guillermo & Perez-Reyna, David & Yogo, Motohiro, 2019. "Leverage dynamics and credit quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 183-212.
    20. Nam, Changwoo, 2016. "Impact of Corporate Tax Cuts on Corporate Investment," KDI Policy Forum 264, Korea Development Institute (KDI).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decision making; Investment project; private information; uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38348. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.