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Unemployment, tax evasion and the "slippery slope" framework

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  • Lisi, Gaetano

Abstract

The proposed theoretical work introduces the basic insights of the ‘slippery slope’ framework into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour market in order to study the relation between tax compliance (both voluntary and enforced), tax evasion and unemployment. This paper shows that the firm's decision to evade taxes also depends on trust in tax authorities, and affects one of the most important macroeconomic variables: the unemployment rate. Also, the model is able to mimic the crucial interaction between trust and power and its effects on voluntary and enforced compliance. The main result is that with the “right mix” of policy tools of deterrence, trust in tax authorities is maximised, (voluntary) tax compliance increases and a reduction of tax evasion may decrease unemployment.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisi, Gaetano, 2012. "Unemployment, tax evasion and the "slippery slope" framework," MPRA Paper 37433, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37433
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
    2. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, December.
    3. Stephan Muehlbacher & Erich Kirchler, 2010. "Tax Compliance by Trust and Power of Authorities," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 607-610.
    4. Rafael La Porta & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "The Unofficial Economy and Economic Development," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(2 (Fall)), pages 275-363.
    5. Kirchler,Erich, 2007. "The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521876742, January.
    6. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    7. Sandmo, Agnar, 2005. "The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 58(4), pages 643-663, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fábio Pereira Silva & Reinaldo Guerreiro & Eduardo Flores, 2019. "Voluntary versus enforced tax compliance: the slippery slope framework in the Brazilian context," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 66(2), pages 147-180, June.
    2. Gaetano Lisi, 2012. "Macroeconomic implications of the dynamics between power and trust: a theoretical formalisation of the ‘slippery slope’ framework," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2012_21, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
    3. Semjén, András, 2017. "Az adózói magatartás különféle magyarázatai [Various explanations for tax compliance]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 140-184.
    4. Tsikas, Stefanos A., 2017. "Enforce Tax Compliance, but Cautiously: The Role of Trust in Authorities and Power of Authorities," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-589, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    5. Egidijus Bikas & Greta Bagdonaitė, 2020. "Tax avoidance: the aspect of value added tax," Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues, VsI Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Center, vol. 8(2), pages 590-605, December.
    6. Colin C. Williams, 2014. "Confronting the Shadow Economy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15370.
    7. Gaetano Lisi, 2015. "Tax morale, tax compliance and the optimal tax policy," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(c), pages 27-32.
    8. Laszlo Gulyas & Tamás Mahr & Istvan Janos Toth, 2015. "Factors to Curb Tax Evasion: Evidences from the TAXSIM Agent-Based Simulation Model," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1521, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    9. Mardhiah Mardhiah & Riyana Miranti & Robert Tanton, 2019. "The Slippery Slope Framework: Extending the Analysis by Investigating Factors Affecting Trust and Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 7494, CESifo.
    10. Batrancea, Larissa M. & Kudła, Janusz & Błaszczak, Barbara & Kopyt, Mateusz, 2022. "Differences in tax evasion attitudes between students and entrepreneurs under the slippery slope framework," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 464-482.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax evasion; tax compliance; trust and power; unemployment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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