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Information sharing in credit markets: incentives for incorrect information reporting

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  • Semenova, Maria

Abstract

The introduction of institutions of credit information sharing - private credit bureaus and public credit registries - in the market for bank loans represent one of the possible solutions of information asymmetry problem, - the problem which the creditors tend to face. However the possibility of information sharing influences the bank's incentives in two different ways. While it disciplines the borrowers and, therefore, reduces the share of bad loans, a bank loses the competitive advantage, namely the monopolistic knowledge about the data in its clients' credit histories. Does the bank have an opportunity at its disposal to use the benefits of information sharing without losing its competitive advantage and its clientele? One way to do so is to report false data on borrowers. This paper analyses the bank's incentives for such opportunistic behavior and describes the impact of false information reporting on the characteristics of market equilibrium. The opportunity to get extra profit and to offer less expensive credit to new clients explains why banks prefer the strategy of dishonest behavior. This paper outlines the role of the informational intermediary in quality control for the data, contained in credit reports. Also, it describes the conditions under which verification of a certain share of reports provides that the parameters characterizing the equilibrium are equal to those in no information asymmetry situation.

Suggested Citation

  • Semenova, Maria, 2006. "Information sharing in credit markets: incentives for incorrect information reporting," MPRA Paper 359, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:359
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pagano, Marco & Jappelli, Tullio, 1993. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1693-1718, December.
    2. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A Survey," CSEF Working Papers 36, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    3. Margaret J. Miller (ed.), 2003. "Credit Reporting Systems and the International Economy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262134225, April.
    4. Padilla, A. Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2000. "Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1951-1980, December.
    5. repec:bla:econom:v:62:y:1995:i:248:p:461-78 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    7. Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 1997. "Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(1), pages 205-236.
    8. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Iakimenko, Irina & Semenova, Maria & Zimin, Eugenii, 2022. "The more the better? Information sharing and credit risk," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    2. Cihak, Martin & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, 2013. "Rethinking the state's role in finance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6400, The World Bank.
    3. Roman Hoffmann & Bernhard Kittel & Mattias Larsen, 2021. "Information exchange in laboratory markets: competition, transfer costs, and the emergence of reputation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(1), pages 118-142, March.
    4. Roman Hoffmann & Bernhard Kittel & Mattias Larsen, 0. "Information exchange in laboratory markets: competition, transfer costs, and the emergence of reputation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 0, pages 1-25.
    5. Laptieva, Nataliia, 2016. "Information sharing and the volume of private credit in transition: Evidence from Ukrainian bank-level panel dataAuthor-Name: Grajzl, Peter," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 434-449.
    6. Doblas-Madrid, Antonio & Minetti, Raoul, 2013. "Sharing information in the credit market: Contract-level evidence from U.S. firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 198-223.
    7. World Bank, 2011. "General Principles for Credit Reporting," World Bank Publications - Reports 12792, The World Bank Group.
    8. Nabi, Mahmoud Sami & Ben Souissi, Souraya, 2011. "Could dishonest banks be disciplined ?," MPRA Paper 32010, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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