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The logic of technical standardisation: a politico-economic model

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  • Nedergaard, Peter

Abstract

In this paper technical standardisation is understood and explained in a model where economic analysis is coupled with an analysis of the political system as proposed in rational choice theory. The aim is to answer both the question why various countries (e.g. the United States versus European countries) let either the market or public intervention determine the mode of technical standardisation and the possible implications of these two ways of organizing technical standardisation from an economic and a political point of view. Based upon the analysis of the paper a couple of general policy recommendations are made concerning the mode of technical standardisation.

Suggested Citation

  • Nedergaard, Peter, 2007. "The logic of technical standardisation: a politico-economic model," MPRA Paper 33107, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33107
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33107/1/MPRA_paper_33107.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rational choice; market failures; technical standards; standardisation; government failures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook

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