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Prohibition of parallel Imports as a hard core Restriction of Article 4 of Block Exception Regulation for vertical Agreements: European Law and Economics

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  • Zevgolis, Nikolaos
  • Fotis, Panagiotis

Abstract

This paper attempts, on the one hand, to reveal the main principles of Competition Law (regulatory and case law framework) covering the prevention of parallel trade, mainly the prohibition of parallel imports or exports, and on the other hand to cast light on the main effects of parallel imports prohibition imposed by an upstream supplier on the competitive structure of the downstream market. Especially, the regulatory framework relates Block Exception Regulation 330/2010, (ex Block Exception Regulation 2790/99), with Block Exception Regulation 461/2010 (ex Block Exception Regulation 1400/2002) in order to determine whether prohibition of parallel trade constitutes a hardcore restriction or not, while the economic analysis evaluates it in a geographical vertical market which constitutes an upstream and a downstream market with few suppliers & buyers respectively which sell goods to the final (domestic) consumers. The results indicate that prohibition of parallel imports by the upstream sellers causes vertical restraints to the domestic customers of the buyers.

Suggested Citation

  • Zevgolis, Nikolaos & Fotis, Panagiotis, 2011. "Prohibition of parallel Imports as a hard core Restriction of Article 4 of Block Exception Regulation for vertical Agreements: European Law and Economics," MPRA Paper 32870, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32870
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Melinda Acutt & Caroline Elliott, 2001. "Threat-Based Competition Policy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 309-317, May.
    2. Panagiotis Fotis & Michael Polemis & Nikolaos Zevgolis, 2011. "Robust Event Studies for Derogation from Suspension of Concentrations in Greece during the Period 1995–2008," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 67-89, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust Law; Vertical Restraints; Block Exception Regulation; Market Imperfection; Consumer Nondurables; Repeated Games of Oligopoly Theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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