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Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: the case of Japan for 1998-2004

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  • Yamamura, Eiji
  • Kondoh, Haruo

Abstract

Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted Information Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official government information. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the period 1998?2004 to examine how this enactment affected the rate of government construction expenditure. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control for unobserved prefecture-specific effects and endogenous bias. The major finding is that disclosure of government information reduces the rate of government construction expenditure. This implies that information disclosure reduces losses from rent-seeking activity, which is consistent with public choice theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Yamamura, Eiji & Kondoh, Haruo, 2011. "Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: the case of Japan for 1998-2004," MPRA Paper 29689, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29689
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yamamura, Eiji & Sabatini, Fabio, 2014. "Superstars in politics: the role of the media in the koizumi regime," MPRA Paper 56178, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Eiji Yamamura & Yoshiro Tsutsui & Fumio Ohtake, 2016. "Relative Income Position and Happiness: Are Cabinet Supporters Different from Others in Japan?," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 67(4), pages 383-402, December.
    3. Eiji Yamamura, 2016. "Governors’ term of office and information disclosure: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 59(1), pages 48-78.
    4. Eiji Yamamura & Fabio Sabatini, 2014. "Superstars in politics: the role of the media in the rise and success of Junichiro Koizumi," Papers 1407.1726, arXiv.org.
    5. Eiji Yamamura & Ryo Ishida, 2021. "Analysis of the implementation of information disclosure ordinances in Japan: the effect on the income of chief executives in local governments," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 52-67, March.
    6. Yamamura, Eiji & Ishida, Ryo, 2017. "Analysis of the implementation of information disclosure ordinances in Japan: the effect on the income of mayors and chief executives in local governments," MPRA Paper 83337, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Yamamura, Eiji, 2013. "Governor’s term and information disclosure: Evidence from Japan," MPRA Paper 45848, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Yukihiro Yazaki, 2017. "Newspapers and political accountability: evidence from Japan," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 311-331, September.
    9. Yamamura, Eiji, 2014. "Time preference and perceptions about government spending and tax: Smokers’ dependence on government support," MPRA Paper 55659, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Yamamura, Eiji & Sabatini, Fabio, 2015. "The impact of the media on voters’ attitude toward Junichiro Koizumi and his policy," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34, pages 24-32.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information disclosure; Special interest group; Construction expenditure; Rent seeking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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