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Wirtschafts- und finanzpolitische Koordinierung in der EU – Erfahrungen aus einem Jahrzehnt Politikkoordinierung
[Public policy coordination in the EU - experiences from one decade of policy coordination]

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  • Ebert, Werner
  • Eckardt, Martina

Abstract

The year 2010 showed how prone to crisis the Euro zone is. To a great extent this results from insufficient public policy coordination of EU member states’ public and fiscal policies. This paper discusses the main reform proposals related to fiscal, public and structural policy against the background of the underlying collective coordination problem. In addition it also considers the suggestions made for introducing a crisis mechanism. Although the main actors in the Euro zone seem to be aware of the problems of the existing coordination mechanisms, it is still doubtful whether the measures finally taken will be effective enough.

Suggested Citation

  • Ebert, Werner & Eckardt, Martina, 2011. "Wirtschafts- und finanzpolitische Koordinierung in der EU – Erfahrungen aus einem Jahrzehnt Politikkoordinierung [Public policy coordination in the EU - experiences from one decade of policy coordi," MPRA Paper 29281, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29281
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29281/1/MPRA_paper_29281.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EU policy coordination; fiscal policy;

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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