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Стратегии Институциональных Реформ: Китай И Россия
[Institutional Reform Strategies: China and Russia]

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  • Polterovich, Victor

Abstract

This is the second part of the work devoted to the problem of the choice of institutional reform strategies. In the first part a concept of a promising trajectory was introduced. This is a trajectory that has good chances to be successful since it meets a number of requirements; their list was discussed in detail. In this paper, proposed analytical tools are used to compare reforms in Russia and China. It is shown that China had no significant advantages with respect to initial conditions. However, Chinese reformers, in contrast to the Russian ones, followed theoretical recommendations and choosed promising trajectories as their strategies. This observation explains the difference in the reform outcomes, and may be also considered as evidence in favor of the theory suggested.

Suggested Citation

  • Polterovich, Victor, 2006. "Стратегии Институциональных Реформ: Китай И Россия [Institutional Reform Strategies: China and Russia]," MPRA Paper 22010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:22010
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    institutional reforms; institutional reform strategies; promising trajectory; economic transition; Russia; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P21 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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