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The role of international public goods in tax cooperation

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  • Kammas, Pantelis
  • Philippopoulos, Apostolis

Abstract

We provide a quantitative assessment of the welfare cost of tax competition or, equivalently, the welfare benefit of international tax policy cooperation. We use a simple multi-country general equilibrium model of a world economy, in which there are two types of cross-country spillovers: the first one is generated by international capital mobility and the second by the presence of an international public good. In the absence of international public goods, although welfare in the non-cooperative case is typically lower than in the cooperative case, the welfare difference is negligible quantitatively. Things change drastically, both quantitatively and qualitatively, once we introduce international public goods. Now, there can be big benefits from cooperation and welfare effects cease to be monotonic.

Suggested Citation

  • Kammas, Pantelis & Philippopoulos, Apostolis, 2009. "The role of international public goods in tax cooperation," MPRA Paper 15844, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15844
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Patricia Sanz‐Córdoba & Bernd Theilen, 2018. "Partial Tax Harmonization Through Infrastructure Coordination," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1399-1416, April.
    2. Liontos, George & Philippopoulos, Apostolis, 2023. "Who benefits from international fiscal cooperation? The role of cross-country asymmetries," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 27(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capital mobility; Tax competition; Public goods; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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