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Model for revelation of unfriendly information impacts in mass-media which are directed on change of public opinion

Author

Listed:
  • Bocharnikov, Victor
  • Sveshnikov, Sergey
  • Voznyak, Stepan
  • Yuzefovich, Vladimir

Abstract

In this article we proposes the mathematical model for revelation of deliberate unfriendly information impacts which are fulfilled by means of specially prepared information messages (news, reviews and others) in mass-media. The model calculates the quantitative measure for fact determination of purposeful information impact and evaluation of potential damage to interests of state (party, corporation) from impact fulfilment. The model use the following data: intensity and direction of information streams (publication frequency and themes of news), structure of important state and public problems, structure of social groups of a society, priorities of these social groups, mass-media popularity in social groups, priorities of a state policy. The model is the semantic network in which the relations between concepts we formalize by use of fuzzy measures by Sugeno. We have used this model for revelation of information impacts on public opinion of Russian-speaking national minority of Crimea (Ukraine) during 01.2002 - 02.2005 (final stage of presidential elections). The model also can has important implications for evaluation of election cleanness, for neutralization of dirty voting technologies, for facts determination of unfair competition, when corporations involve a public opinion into own competitive activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Bocharnikov, Victor & Sveshnikov, Sergey & Voznyak, Stepan & Yuzefovich, Vladimir, 2009. "Model for revelation of unfriendly information impacts in mass-media which are directed on change of public opinion," MPRA Paper 15402, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15402
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lohmann, Susanne, 1993. "A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 319-333, June.
    2. Gartner, Scott Sigmund, 2008. "The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 95-106, February.
    3. Koster, M. & Lindelauf, R. & Lindner, I. & Owen, G., 2008. "Mass-mobilization with noisy conditional beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 55-77, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information impact; public opinion; fuzzy measures; preferences; social groups;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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