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Optimal Strategies for Automated Traders in a Producer-Consumer Futures Market

Author

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  • Laib, Fodil
  • Radjef, MS

Abstract

The aim of this work is to show how automated traders can operate a futures market. First, we established some hypothesises on the properties of the ’correct’ price pattern which translates accurately the underlying moves in the supply/demand balance and the nominal price, then mathematical measures were derived allowing to estimate the efficiency of a given trading strategy. As a starting step, we applied our approach to a simplified market setup where only two automated traders, a producer and a consumer, can trade. They receive a stream of forecasts on supply and demand levels and they should react instantaneously by adjusting these forecasts, then issuing sale and buy orders. Later, we suggested a parameterized trading strategy for the two automatons. Finally, we obtained by simulation the optimal parameters of this strategy in some particular cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Laib, Fodil & Radjef, MS, 2008. "Optimal Strategies for Automated Traders in a Producer-Consumer Futures Market," MPRA Paper 12965, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:12965
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    Cited by:

    1. Laib, Fodil & Radjef, MS, 2010. "Automatizing Price Negotiation in Commodities Markets," MPRA Paper 28277, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Automated traders; optimal strategies; agent based;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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