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Последовательные Труэли: Равновесие С Выживанием Сильнейшего
[Sequential Truels: an equilibrium with the survival of the fittest]

Author

Listed:
  • Dmitry, Ilinskiy
  • Sergey, Izmalkov
  • Alexey, Savvateev

Abstract

A sequential truel is a generalisation of duel. This type of games is known because of the «survival of the weakest» paradox, where weakest player have the highest probability of survival. We analyse a typical variation of this model, in which players are allowed to shoot in the air. We show that there exists a SPE-equilibrium, where the strongest player, against the paradox statement, has the highest probability of survival.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitry, Ilinskiy & Sergey, Izmalkov & Alexey, Savvateev, 2022. "Последовательные Труэли: Равновесие С Выживанием Сильнейшего [Sequential Truels: an equilibrium with the survival of the fittest]," MPRA Paper 115766, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:115766
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/115766/1/MPRA_paper_115766.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Wegener & Evla Mutlu, 2021. "The good, the bad, the well-connected," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(3), pages 759-771, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    truel; SPE; survival of the weakest;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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