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Agreeing to Disagree with Multiple Priors

Author

Listed:
  • Andrés Carvajal

    (CRETA and Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

  • João Correia-da-Silva

    (CEF.UP and Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)

Abstract

We present an extension of Aumann's Agreement Theorem to the case of multiple priors. If agents update all their priors, then, for the Agreement Theorem to hold, it is sufficient to assume that they have closed, connected and intersecting sets of priors. On the other hand, if agents select the priors to be updated according to the maximum likelihood criterion, then, under these same assumptions, agents may still agree to disagree. For the Agreement Theorem to hold, it is also necessary to assume that the maximum likelihood priors are commonly known and not disjoint. To show that these hypotheses are necessary, we give several examples in which agents agree to disagree.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Carvajal & João Correia-da-Silva, 2010. "Agreeing to Disagree with Multiple Priors," FEP Working Papers 368, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    • Handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:368
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    File URL: http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/10.04.09_wp368.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Galanis, S. & Ioannou, C. & Kotronis, S., 2019. "Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 20/05, Department of Economics, City University London.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agreeing to disagree; multiple priors; Aumann's Agreement Theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics

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