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Shared state taxes and tax policy of local self-governments in connection with tax morale

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  • Agnes Sipos

    (Budapest Business School)

Abstract

Based on our assumption, tax morale significantly depends on a country’s legal, historical, social and cultural background and circumstances. In the first part of the paper, we discuss the legal dimension of the tax morale – including the interconnection of law, ethics and moral. Furthermore, we analyze the facts breaching tax liabilities under the scope of the criminal law and the actions violating the tax morale but not qualified as infringement of the criminal law. In the second part of the paper, we provide empirical evidences which factors (e.g. personal characteristics, commitment for paying local taxes, knowledge about the distribution of paid taxes between central and local authorities, etc.) determine significantly the individual level of tax morale. The paper discusses these complex connections either from the viewpoint of law or economics in order to find out whether it is possible to develop the tax morale of individuals, or can the legislator adequately rule the different forms of tax evasion.

Suggested Citation

  • Agnes Sipos, 2015. "Shared state taxes and tax policy of local self-governments in connection with tax morale," Working Papers 101/2015, Institute of Economic Research, revised Apr 2015.
  • Handle: RePEc:pes:wpaper:2015:no101
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax morale; legal morale; tax regime; tax system;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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