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Coasian Bargaining with An Arriving Outside Option

Author

Listed:
  • Ilwoo Hwang

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Fei Li

    (Department of Economics, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill)

Abstract

We consider Coasian bargaining problems where the buyer has an outside option arriving at a stochastic time. We study both observable outside option models and unobservable outside option models. In both models, we show that a Coasian equilibrium exists if (1) the arrival of the outside option is public, or (2) the arrival of the outside option is private but the arrival probability is small enough. (1) the seller makes multiple rounds of offers, and (2) the Coase conjecture holds for an arbitrarily large arrival rate of the outside option. The result also applies to the time-varying outside option model. This exercise helps us to understand the sharp difference between Board and Pycia (2013), where the buyer's outside option is always available, and the standard Coasian bargaining literature, where the buyer has no outside option.

Suggested Citation

  • Ilwoo Hwang & Fei Li, 2013. "Coasian Bargaining with An Arriving Outside Option," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-047, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:13-047
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ilwoo Hwang, 2013. "A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-050, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "True Monopolistic Competition as a Result of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 493-511.
    3. Stahl, Dale O, II, 1989. "Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 700-712, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ilwoo Hwang, 2013. "A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-050, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Arriving Outside Option; Dynamic Games; Coase Conjecture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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