IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/oxf/wpaper/394.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cooperation in Multiple Spheres of Interaction

Author

Listed:
  • Heinrich Harald Nax

Abstract

This note introduces transferable utility cooperative games with multiple membership, extending the scope of cooperative game theory to economic environments featuring externalities and membership in multiple coalitions. This wider class of games generalises games in characteristic and partition function form. definitions of the core for this class of games are proposed, under which cooperation is facilitated through the cross-cutting of contractual arrangements with multiple membership.

Suggested Citation

  • Heinrich Harald Nax, 2008. "Cooperation in Multiple Spheres of Interaction," Economics Series Working Papers 394, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:394
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:71b1d6c7-7f4d-4dba-89bf-20a8a82bcaa7
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Licun Xue, 2015. "Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 315-343, October.
    2. Thomas Norman & Heinrich H. Nax, 2011. "Leading the Way: Coalitional Stability in Technological Cooperation & Sequential Climate Policy," Economics Series Working Papers 585, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative Game Theory; Core; Externalities; Multiple Membership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:394. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Anne Pouliquen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfeixuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.