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Harmony of Games in Normal Form

Author

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  • Daniel John Zizzo

Abstract

Game harmony is a generic game property that can be used to predict cooperation in both generic and well-known normal form games. It describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs. Pure coordination games are games of complete harmony, and constant-sum games of pure disharmony: the majority of games is somewhere in the middle. This paper provides measures of game harmony, analyzes their properties and reviews their use as predictors of cooperation in games. Framing effects increasing cooperation may work by increasing perceived game harmony.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel John Zizzo, 2003. "Harmony of Games in Normal Form," Economics Series Working Papers 150, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:150
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    File URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:31ad5154-578b-4712-9e07-cb8764abaf94
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zizzo, Daniel John & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2007. "Perceived harmony, similarity and cooperation in 2 x 2 games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 365-386, June.
    2. Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2008. "The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking," Discussion Papers 2008-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    3. Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2008. "Groups, cooperation and conflict in games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-17, February.
    4. Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2008. "The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking," Discussion Papers 2008-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperation; game harmony; normal form games; framing effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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