Optimal Fiscal Spending and Deviation Rules under Political Uncertainty
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More about this item
Keywords
Fiscal rules; Government debt; Political turnover.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2024-04-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2024-04-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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