IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/jkvz6_v1.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policymaking

Author

Listed:
  • Schnakenberg, Keith
  • Turner, Ian R

    (Yale University)

Abstract

Lobbying is a potential source of corruption but is also a valuable source of information for policymakers. We analyze a game-theoretic model that shows how the threat of corruption affects the incentives of non-corrupt politicians to enlist the help of lobbyists to make more informed decisions. Politicians face a dilemma because voters cannot always tell whether a politician allows access to lobbyists in order to solicit corruption or to seek information. Thus, a non-corrupt politician may deny access to lobbyists to signal that she is non-corrupt even though doing so impedes her ability to make good policy. This signaling may decrease the welfare of the voters depending on the value of the lost policy information relative to the value of screening out corrupt politicians.

Suggested Citation

  • Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2019. "Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policymaking," SocArXiv jkvz6_v1, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:jkvz6_v1
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/jkvz6_v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/5c6afc941650690019135b59/
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/jkvz6_v1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:jkvz6_v1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arabixiv.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.