Optimal Salaries of Researchers with Motivational Emergence

In the context of scientific policy and science management, this study examines the system of nonuniform wage distribution for researchers. A nonlinear mathematical model of optimal remuneration for scientific workers has been developed, considering key and additive aspects of scientific activity: basic qualifications, research productivity, collaborative projects, skill enhancement, distinctions, and international collaborations. Unlike traditional linear schemes, the proposed approach is based on exponential and logarithmic dependencies, allowing for the consideration of saturation effects and preventing artificial wage growth due to mechanical increases in scientific productivity indicators. The study includes detailed calculations of optimal, minimum, and maximum wages, demonstrating a fair distribution of remuneration on the basis of researcher productivity. A linear increase in publication activity or grant funding should not lead to uncontrolled salary growth, thus avoiding distortions in the motivational system. The results of this study can be used to reform and modernize the wage system for researchers in Kazakhstan and other countries, as well as to optimize grant-based science funding mechanisms. The proposed methodology fosters scientific motivation, long-term productivity, and the internationalization of research while also promoting self-actualization and ultimately forming an adequate and authentic reward system for the research community. Specifically, in resource-limited scientific systems, science policy should focus on the qualitative development of individual researchers rather than quantitative expansion (e.g., increasing the number of scientists). This can be achieved through the productive progress of their motivation and self-actualization.