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Agent Selection and Belief Polarization in Distributive Bargaining

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  • Hagmann, David

    (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

  • Feiler, Daniel

Abstract

The selection of an agent precedes most principal-agent relationships, but the consequences of this selection process remain largely unstudied. Across three preregistered experiments (N = 3,190), we show that principals choose agents who make overly aggressive offers. Principals' selection leads to worse outcomes than if they chose randomly or negotiated on their own behalf, and could be improved by unilaterally selecting less aggressive agents. These less-aggressive agents, however, fail to persist in the market. Principals neglect the increasing polarization of the agent pool, continue to select relatively aggressive agents, and become more polarized in their own beliefs.

Suggested Citation

  • Hagmann, David & Feiler, Daniel, 2020. "Agent Selection and Belief Polarization in Distributive Bargaining," OSF Preprints y6tq2_v1, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:osfxxx:y6tq2_v1
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/y6tq2_v1
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