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Trade-Related International Regulatory Co-operation: A Theoretical Framework

Author

Listed:
  • Martin von Lampe

    (OECD)

  • Koen Deconinck

    (OECD)

  • Véronique Bastien

    (OECD)

Abstract

This report provides a conceptual foundation for the analysis of international regulatory co-operation (IRC) and its potential benefits through reduced trade costs. Different forms of IRC aiming to reduce specification, conformity assessment and information costs - which can arise from regulatory heterogeneity, costly conformity assessment procedures and insufficient regulatory transparency – are addressed. The report argues that trade costs need to be balanced against the regulatory objectives of mitigating various market imperfections. Integrating these two elements often allows significant gains in terms of national welfare, gains that can be augmented by negotiated outcomes among trading partners. IRC may also have important effects on trade with third countries. Related welfare implications are, however, ambiguous and depend on the specifics of the IRC outcome as well as on third countries’ own regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin von Lampe & Koen Deconinck & Véronique Bastien, 2016. "Trade-Related International Regulatory Co-operation: A Theoretical Framework," OECD Trade Policy Papers 195, OECD Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:traaab:195-en
    DOI: 10.1787/3fbf60b1-en
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    conformity assessment costs; game theory; information costs; Nash equilibrium; regulation; specification costs; trade costs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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