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Strategy Proofness and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Existence and Equivalence Theorems for Voting Procedures

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  • Mark Allen Satterthwaite

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  • Mark Allen Satterthwaite, 1974. "Strategy Proofness and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Existence and Equivalence Theorems for Voting Procedures," Discussion Papers 72, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:72
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fishburn, Peter C, 1970. "Comments on Hansson's 'Group Preferences'," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(6), pages 933-935, November.
    2. Fishburn, Peter C., 1972. "Lotteries and social choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 189-207, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Elisha A Pazner & Eugene Wesley, 1974. "Infinite Voters and the Possibility of a Cheatproof Social Choice Function," Discussion Papers 125, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

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