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Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information

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  • Roger B. Myerson

Abstract

Summary A bargaining solution concept which generalizes the Nash bargaining solution and the Shapley NTU value is defined for cooperative games with incomplete information. These bargaining solutions are efficient and equitable when interpersonal comparisons are made in terms of certain virtual utility scales. A player’s virtual utility differs from his real utility by exaggerating the difference from the preferences of false types that jeopardize his true type. In any incentive-efficient mechanism, the players always maximize their total virtual utility ex post. Conditionally transferable virtual utility is the strongest possible transferability assumption for games with incomplete information.
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  • Roger B. Myerson, 1982. "Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 528, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:528
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    Cited by:

    1. Dionysius Glycopantis & Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Konrad Podczeck, 2009. "Symposium on: equilibria with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 217-219, February.
    2. Beth Allen, 1996. "Implementation theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 226, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    3. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
    4. Beth Allen, 1996. "Cooperative theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 225, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    5. Jerez, Belen, 2003. "A dual characterization of incentive efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 1-34, September.

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