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Adaptive dynamics with payoff heterogeneit

Author

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  • David P Myatt
  • Chris Wallace

Abstract

A finite population of agents playing a 2 x 2 symmetric game evolves by adaptive best response. The assumption that players make mistakes is dropped in favor of one where players differ, via payoff heterogeneity. Arbitrary mutations are thus replaced with an economically justified specification. The depth as well as the width of basins of attraction is important when determining long-run behaviour. With vanishing noise and balanced payoff variances, the risk dominant equilibrium is selected. Unbalanced variances may result in the selection of other equilibra, including the payoff dominant. The ergodic extremer correspond exactly to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the underlying trembled stage game. This enables an analysis of the ergodic distribution for non-vanishing nise and larger populations.
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Suggested Citation

  • David P Myatt & Chris Wallace, "undated". "Adaptive dynamics with payoff heterogeneit," Economics Papers W31., Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    • Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:9631
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    File URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/1996/w31/adaptv4.ps
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1402, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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