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Primary Physicians’ Response to Changes in Fees

Author

Listed:
  • Fredrik Carlsen

    (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

  • Jostein Grytten

    (Dental Faculty, University of Oslo, Norway)

  • Irene Skau

    (Dental Faculty, University of Oslo, Norway)

Abstract

The study examines how the service production of primary physicians in Norway is influenced by changes in fees. The data represent about 2 650 fee-for-service physicians for the years 1995-2000. We constructed a variable that made it possible to estimate income effects of fee changes on service levels. Service production was measured by the number of consultations per physician, the number of laboratory tests per consultation, and the proportion of consultations lasting more than 20 minutes. Our main finding is that fee changes have no income effect on service production. Our results imply that fee regulation can be an effective means of controlling physicians’ income, and therefore government expenditure on primary physician services.

Suggested Citation

  • Fredrik Carlsen & Jostein Grytten & Irene Skau, 2006. "Primary Physicians’ Response to Changes in Fees," Working Paper Series 8206, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
    • Handle: RePEc:nst:samfok:8206
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Grytten, Jostein & Sorensen, Rune, 2003. "Practice variation and physician-specific effects," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 403-418, May.
    10. Jon Gruber & John Kim & Dina Mayzlin, 1998. "Physician Fees and Procedure Intensity: The Case of Cesarean Delivery," NBER Working Papers 6744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Jostein Grytten & Fredrik Carlsen & Irene Skau, 2001. "The income effect and supplier induced demand. Evidence from primary physician services in Norway," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(11), pages 1455-1467.
    12. Shwartz, M. & Martin, S.G. & Cooper, D.D. & Ljung, G.M. & Whalen, B.J. & Blackburn, J., 1981. "The effect of a thirty per cent reduction in physician fees on Medicaid surgery rates in Massachusetts," American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, vol. 71(4), pages 370-375.
    13. Fredrik Carlsen & Jostein Grytten & Irene Skau, 2003. "Financial incentives and the supply of laboratory tests," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 4(4), pages 279-285, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andreassen, Leif & Di Tommaso, Maria Laura & Strøm, Steinar, 2013. "Do medical doctors respond to economic incentives?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 392-409.
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    3. Pablo Cos & Enrique Moral-Benito, 2014. "Determinants of health-system efficiency: evidence from OECD countries," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 69-93, March.
    4. Grytten, Jostein & Carlsen, Fredrik & Skau, Irene, 2009. "Services production and patient satisfaction in primary care," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(3), pages 312-321, March.

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