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Why Are Bank Failures Special? Lessons from U.S. Financial History

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  • Ronnie J. Phillips

Abstract

In the U.S., corporate bankruptcies generally go through the court system for resolution, whereas bank failures are resolved by bank regulatory agencies. The goal of corporate bankruptcy is to maximize the value of the firm as a 'going concern' in liquidation to the shareholders. In a bank failure, the goal is to minimize the loss to the FDIC. The treatment of bank failures is attributed to their 'special' nature that is related to their role in providing a convenient means of payment and the provisioning of credit. Additionally, the presumed contagious nature of bank failures is often cited as something that exacerbates macroeconomic problems. Though the United States is not alone in the world in its special treatment of bank failures, it does differ from many countries, most notably the United Kingdom. Since the United States is widely regarded as having an efficient financial system that has aided economic growth, this raises the question of whether there are lessons to be learned from the United States financial history. I argue that the evolution of banking in the United States was unique in that for most of its early history state chartered banks provided currency, early bank failures influenced liability insurance programs, and the role of private or unchartered banking was not important prior to the Civil War. This unique history explains why the United States evolved in the manner it did, and why the system in the United States may not necessarily be the best policy recommendation for other countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronnie J. Phillips, 2008. "Why Are Bank Failures Special? Lessons from U.S. Financial History," NFI Working Papers 2008-WP-04, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:nfi:nfiwps:2008-wp-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barth,James R. & Caprio,Gerard & Levine,Ross, 2008. "Rethinking Bank Regulation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521709309, September.
    2. Sylla, Richard, 1976. "Forgotten Men of Money: Private Bankers in Early U.S. History," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 173-188, March.
    3. Walker F. Todd, 1994. "Bank receivership and conservatorship," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Oct.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bankruptcy; bank failures; U.S. financial history; financial institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N21 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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