Moderated Online Communities and User-Generated Content
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
moderation; reputation; online community; knowledge management;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2009-10-24 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-ICT-2009-10-24 (Information and Communication Technologies)
- NEP-LAW-2009-10-24 (Law and Economics)
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