Corruption in Cities: Graft and Politics in American Cities at the Turn of the Twentieth Century
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Cited by:
- Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2005.
"Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability: An Overview,"
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dp-152, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Dilip Mookherjee & Pranab Bardhan, 2005. "Decentralization, Corruption And Government Accountability: An Overview," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-023, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Jun 2005.
- Rajeev K. Goel & Ummad Mazhar & Rati Ram, 2022.
"Dimensions of size and corruption perceptions versus corruption experiences by firms in emerging economies,"
Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 46(2), pages 374-396, April.
- Rajeev K. Goel & Ummad Mazhar & Rati Ram, 2021. "Size Matters: Corruption Perceptions versus Corruption Experiences by Firms," CESifo Working Paper Series 9221, CESifo.
- Panchali Banerjee & Vivekananda Mukherjee, 2020. "Bureaucratic competition versus monopoly: measuring corruption and welfare," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 51-65, June.
- David M. Cutler & Grant Miller, 2006.
"Water, Water Everywhere. Municipal Finance and Water Supply in American Cities,"
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- David Cutler & Grant Miller, 2005. "Water, Water, Everywhere: Municipal Finance and Water Supply in American Cities," NBER Working Papers 11096, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HIS-2004-08-31 (Business, Economic and Financial History)
- NEP-PBE-2003-09-28 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2004-08-31 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2003-09-28 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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