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Notes on the Role of TARGET in a Stage III Crisis

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  • Peter M. Garber

Abstract

When Stage III of EMU begins on January 1, 1999, member countries will irrevocably lock exchange rates, and interbank payments in euros will commence. Will the ensuing respite from Stage II instabilities be permanent or only the eye of the storm? Can Stage III itself be subject to an attack that forces a realignment of the of the system? The key question for this paper is how the infrastructural arrangements designed to underpin the monetary union will emerge to determine capital flow dynamics in a crisis and accentuate potential cross-border flows. The answer lies in the details of the TARGET payment system, which can provide the inter-central bank credit necessary to fund an attack.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter M. Garber, 1998. "Notes on the Role of TARGET in a Stage III Crisis," NBER Working Papers 6619, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6619
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    1. Mr. Michael G. Spencer & Mr. Peter M. Garber, 1992. "The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Lessons for Currency Reform," IMF Working Papers 1992/066, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bofinger, Peter & Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Schnabel, Isabel & Wieland, Volker, 2018. "Vor wichtigen wirtschaftspolitischen Weichenstellungen. Jahresgutachten 2018/19 [Setting the Right Course for Economic Policy. Annual Report 2018/19]," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201819, February.
    2. Sinn Hans-Werner, 2019. "Der Streit um die Targetsalden : Kommentar zu Martin Hellwigs Artikel „Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle?“," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 20(3), pages 170-217, September.
    3. Pisani-Ferry, Jean, 2013. "The known unknowns and unknown unknowns of European Monetary Union," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 6-14.
    4. Raphael A. Auer, 2014. "What drives TARGET2 balances? Evidence from a panel analysis [What drives Target2 balances? Evidence from a panel analysis]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 29(77), pages 139-197.
    5. Thomas Mayer & Jochen Möbert & Christian Weistroffer, 2011. "Makroökonomische Ungleichgewichte in der EWU und das Eurosystem," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 64(16), pages 31-38, September.
    6. Thomas Mayer & Jochen Möbert & Christian Weistroffer, 2012. "Macroeconomic Imbalances in EMU and the Eurosystem," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(SPECIALIS), pages 35-42, February.
    7. Marcel Canoy & Machiel van Dijk & Jan Lemmen & Ruud de Mooij & Jürgen Weigand, 2001. "Competition and stability in banking," CPB Document 15.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    8. Eisenschmidt, Jens & Kedan, Danielle & Schmitz, Martin, 2024. "Euro area monetary policy and TARGET balances: A trilogy," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    9. Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2012. "Target loans, current account balances and capital flows: the ECB’s rescue facility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(4), pages 468-508, August.
    10. Aaron Tornell & Frank Westermann, 2012. "Greece: The Sudden Stop That Wasn’t," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(SPECIALIS), pages 102-103, February.
    11. Freixas, Xavier & Parigi, Bruno M & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2000. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 611-638, August.
    12. Sergio Cesaratto, 2013. "The implications of TARGET2 in the European balance of payments crisis and beyond," European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 10(3), pages 359-382.
    13. Aaron Tornell & Frank Westermann, 2012. "Greece: The Sudden Stop That Wasn’t," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(1), pages 102-103, February.
    14. Barry Eichengreen, 2010. "The Breakup of the Euro Area," NBER Chapters, in: Europe and the Euro, pages 11-51, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Robert P. Flood & Peter M. Garber, 2000. "Is Launching the Euro Unstable in the Endgame?," NBER Chapters, in: Currency Crises, pages 163-177, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Giovannini, Alessandro & Ioannou, Demosthenes & Stracca, Livio, 2022. "Public and private risk sharing: friends or foes? The interplay between different forms of risk sharing," Occasional Paper Series 295, European Central Bank.
    17. Wolf, Marvin, 2013. "Währungsunionen und Allmendeproblem," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-521, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    18. Buiter, Willem & Rahbari, Ebrahim, 2012. "Target2 Redux: The simple accountancy and slightly more complex economics of Bundesbank loss exposure through the Eurosystem," CEPR Discussion Papers 9211, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Cornelius, Peter K. & Trimbur, Thomas, 2000. "Heterogeneous policy responses and the risk of monetary disintegration in Europe," Research Notes 00-1, Deutsche Bank Research.
    20. Peter B. Kenen, 2000. "Comment on "Is Launching the Euro Unstable in the Endgame?"," NBER Chapters, in: Currency Crises, pages 177-181, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Thomas Mayer & Jochen Möbert & Christian Weistroffer, 2012. "Macroeconomic Imbalances in EMU and the Eurosystem," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(1), pages 35-42, February.
    22. Sotiropoulos, Dimitris P., 2012. "Revisiting the 1992-93 EMS crisis in the context of international political economy," Economics Discussion Papers 2012-7, School of Economics, Kingston University London.
    23. Rosati, Simonetta & Secola, Stefania, 2005. "Explaining cross-border large-value payment flows: evidence from TARGET and EURO 1 data," Working Paper Series 443, European Central Bank.

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