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The Dynamic Fiscal Costs of Outsourcing Health Insurance - Evidence from Medicaid

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  • Timothy Layton
  • Eran Politzer

Abstract

Setting payment rates for providers contracted over multiple periods is a persistent challenge in government procurement. We study the dynamics of fiscal costs following the outsourcing of Medicaid provision to private health insurers by states. We focus on beneficiaries with disabilities who account for a third of Medicaid's spending. Using a national administrative database, we identify county-level private plan enrollment mandates and exploit them as an instrument for individuals' transition to managed care plans. These transitions, while initially slightly reducing fiscal costs, lead to a continuous increase in Medicaid's costs over subsequent years. Counties subject to mandates experience a 9.8% higher cost four years post-mandate compared to those without mandates. "Actuarially sound" endogenous payment rates, that are based on past costs in the market, may serve as mechanism underlying the rising spending.

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy Layton & Eran Politzer, 2024. "The Dynamic Fiscal Costs of Outsourcing Health Insurance - Evidence from Medicaid," NBER Working Papers 33302, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33302
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Currie, Janet & Fahr, John, 2005. "Medicaid managed care: effects on children's Medicaid coverage and utilization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 85-108, January.
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    3. Mark Duggan & Jonathan Gruber & Boris Vabson, 2018. "The Consequences of Health Care Privatization: Evidence from Medicare Advantage Exits," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 153-186, February.
    4. Marton, James & Yelowitz, Aaron & Talbert, Jeffery C., 2014. "A tale of two cities? The heterogeneous impact of medicaid managed care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 47-68.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

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