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When Democracy Refuses to Die: Evaluating a Training Program for New Politicians

Author

Listed:
  • Ernesto Dal Bó
  • Claudio Ferraz
  • Frederico Finan
  • Pedro Pessoa

Abstract

We evaluate the effects of a program in Brazil that selects and trains new politicians, addressing three main challenges: selection bias from program screening, self-selection into candidacy, and the need to quantify the contributions of both selection and training in a holistic evaluation. Our findings show that the program raised political entry by doubling candidacy rates and increasing electoral success by 69%. However, much of the overall effect was driven by screening, which accounted for 30% of the increase in candidacy and 43% of the increase in election rates, while also making the candidate pool more diverse, competent, and committed to democratic values. Renewing the political class involves trade-offs, as some traits favored by the program did not align with voter preferences, and also reduced the descriptive representation of low-income individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernesto Dal Bó & Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan & Pedro Pessoa, 2024. "When Democracy Refuses to Die: Evaluating a Training Program for New Politicians," NBER Working Papers 33251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33251
    Note: DEV POL
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P0 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General

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