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The Causal Effects of Income on Political Attitudes and Behavior: A Randomized Field Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • David E. Broockman
  • Elizabeth Rhodes
  • Alexander W. Bartik
  • Karina Dotson
  • Sarah Miller
  • Patrick K. Krause
  • Eva Vivalt

Abstract

We study the causal effects of income on political attitudes and behavior with a field experiment. In the experiment, a non-profit gifted 1,000 low-income Americans $1,000 per month for three years tax-free, and 2,000 control participants $50 monthly. Contrary to resource models of participation, we find no effects on political participation or engagement, and rule out effects equivalent to the observational association between turnout and income. Political preferences largely do not change, with the estimates again distinguishable from the observational relationship that economic conservatism increases with income. Dispositions such as trust in government, polarization, and support for democracy also do not change. We do find effects consistent with mood misattribution: affect towards one's own racial group, other racial groups, and some politicians slightly improves. There is also some evidence that treated participants saw work as more important for individuals, society, or even as a requirement for accessing government programs; qualitative evidence illuminates potential mechanisms. Our findings contrast with findings from other economic shocks such as government-sponsored or taxable transfers—thereby helping clarify the mechanisms likely responsible for their effects—and underscore the durability of political predispositions.

Suggested Citation

  • David E. Broockman & Elizabeth Rhodes & Alexander W. Bartik & Karina Dotson & Sarah Miller & Patrick K. Krause & Eva Vivalt, 2024. "The Causal Effects of Income on Political Attitudes and Behavior: A Randomized Field Experiment," NBER Working Papers 33214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33214
    Note: POL
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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