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Pocketbook Politics: The Impact of Wealth on Political Preferences and Participation

Author

Listed:
  • Anton Brännlund
  • David Cesarini
  • Karl-Oskar Lindgren
  • Erik Lindqvist
  • Sven Oskarsson
  • Robert Östling

Abstract

The rich tend to support policies favoring the affluent and are over-represented among both voters and legislators. This paper investigates whether these correlations reflect causal effects of wealth by leveraging random, positive wealth shocks in the form of lottery prizes. Compared to suitably matched controls, large-prize winners are no more likely to cast votes in national elections or run for political office. We also find no significant effects of parents’ lottery winnings on their children’s political participation. But winners of large lottery prizes become more negative toward taxes on wealth, real estate and inheritances. Although we do not detect any statistically significant effects on other political preferences, effects tend to go in the direction of a more right-wing political orientation. We find no evidence that lottery wealth changes moral values or strengthen beliefs in the importance of hard work for success in life.

Suggested Citation

  • Anton Brännlund & David Cesarini & Karl-Oskar Lindgren & Erik Lindqvist & Sven Oskarsson & Robert Östling, 2024. "Pocketbook Politics: The Impact of Wealth on Political Preferences and Participation," NBER Working Papers 32777, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32777
    Note: POL
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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