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Dynamic Collective Action and the Power of Large Numbers

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  • Marco Battaglini
  • Thomas R. Palfrey

Abstract

Individuals in a group decide over time whether or not to participate in a collective action. The cost of participation is private information, and a minimum number of participants is required for success. Individuals have incentives to delay their decisions to observe the commitments of others, resulting in complex equilibrium dynamics. While the probability of success is always positive, there is a positive probability that the process halts before success is achieved. For large groups, success is either achieved instantly or never, depending on the rate at which the required number of participants diverges to infinity.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Battaglini & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2024. "Dynamic Collective Action and the Power of Large Numbers," NBER Working Papers 32473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32473
    Note: POL
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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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