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How Rules and Compliance Impact Organizational Outcomes: Evidence from Delegation in Environmental Regulation

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Listed:
  • James Fenske
  • Muhammad Haseeb
  • Namrata Kala

Abstract

Formal rules within organizations are pervasive, but may be interpreted and implemented differently by actors within the organization, impacting organizational outcomes. We consider a delegation reform that changed formal rules within the environmental regulator in an Indian state, by giving decision rights to junior officers over certain types of application. Using novel data on firms' environmental permit applications and internal communications within the regulator, we study how the delegation of formal authority affects its actual allocation, the consequences for applicant firms, and the circumstances that lead senior officers to withhold this authority. The change in decision rights led to greater approval rates for applicant firms. However, only two thirds of applications that should have been delegated according to the rules were actually delegated. We show that senior officers chose to retain decision rights over more difficult applications, namely, applications with higher pollution potential. Furthermore, baseline disagreement with more subordinates' recommendations reduces delegation post-reform, and officers facing a higher backlog of applications are more likely to delegate. These results are consistent with a framework where the allocation of decision rights is determined by a knowledge hierarchy and where different senior officers face varying costs of delegation at different times.

Suggested Citation

  • James Fenske & Muhammad Haseeb & Namrata Kala, 2023. "How Rules and Compliance Impact Organizational Outcomes: Evidence from Delegation in Environmental Regulation," NBER Working Papers 31991, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31991
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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