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Constitutions and Order: A Theory and Evidence from Colombia and the United States

Author

Listed:
  • Leopoldo Fergusson
  • Javier Mejia
  • James A. Robinson
  • Santiago Torres

Abstract

We propose a framework to explain why some societies may end up with different constitutional solutions to the problem of maintaining order in the face of self-interested behavior. Though the salient intellectual tradition since Hobbes has focused on how institutional design is used to eradicate violence, our framework illustrates that equilibrium constitutions may in fact have to deliberately allow for violence. This arises because some societies are unable to use institutions to influence income distribution. In this case, a constitutional tolerance of violence emerges as a credible way for an incumbent to meet the participation constraint of a challenger. We illustrate the results with the comparative constitutional history of the US and Colombia.

Suggested Citation

  • Leopoldo Fergusson & Javier Mejia & James A. Robinson & Santiago Torres, 2023. "Constitutions and Order: A Theory and Evidence from Colombia and the United States," NBER Working Papers 31501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31501
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General

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