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Priority-based Assignment with Reserves and Quotas

Author

Listed:
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
  • Aram Grigoryan

Abstract

We study priority-based assignment problems with distributional and diversity objectives. Our work provides an axiomatic characterization of a general class of choice rules which are based on type-specific reserves and quotas. The choice rules in the class differ by the order in which applicants are considered for units reserved for different types. We show that a particular reserves- and quotas-based choice rule, where all applicants are first considered for units reserved for their own types, uniquely minimizes priority violations in this class.

Suggested Citation

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Aram Grigoryan, 2021. "Priority-based Assignment with Reserves and Quotas," NBER Working Papers 28689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28689
    Note: TWP
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w28689.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Tayfun Sonmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2022. "Constitutional Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies in India," Papers 2203.01483, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022. "School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Federico Echenique & Teddy Mekonnen & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2024. "Diversity in Choice as Majorization," Papers 2407.17589, arXiv.org.
    4. Battal Dou{g}an & Kenzo Imamura & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2022. "Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking," Papers 2209.06777, arXiv.org.
    5. Chapelle, Guillaume & Domènech Arumí, Gerard & Gobbi, Paula Eugenia, 2023. "Housing, Neighborhoods and Inequality," CEPR Discussion Papers 17969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Aram Grigoryan & Markus Moller, 2023. "A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms," Papers 2305.09314, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • I39 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Other

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