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The Rise of Dual-Class Stock IPOs

Author

Listed:
  • Dhruv Aggarwal
  • Ofer Eldar
  • Yael Hochberg
  • Lubomir P. Litov

Abstract

We create a novel dataset to examine the nature and determinants of dual-class IPOs. We document that dual-class firms have different types of controlling shareholders and wedges between voting and economic rights. We find that the founders' wedge is largest when founders have stronger bargaining power. The increase in founder wedge over time is due to increased willingness by venture capitalists to accommodate founder control and technological shocks that reduced firms' needs for external financing. Greater founder bargaining power is also associated with a lower likelihood of sunset provisions that eliminate dual-class structures within specified periods.

Suggested Citation

  • Dhruv Aggarwal & Ofer Eldar & Yael Hochberg & Lubomir P. Litov, 2021. "The Rise of Dual-Class Stock IPOs," NBER Working Papers 28609, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28609
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Lambert & Daniel Liebau & Peter Roosenboom, 2022. "Security token offerings," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 299-325, June.
    2. Mary Brooke Billings & Kevin Hsueh & Melissa F. Lewis-Western & Gladriel Shobe, 2023. "Innovations in IPO Deal Structure: Do Up-C IPOs Harm Public Shareholders?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 3048-3079, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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